When Gouldner is concerned with tI1C sociology of sociologv he makes some important contributions. He is bothered bv the fact that sociologists seem to feel that they are not governed bv the same social processes which govern the behavior of those they study. Gouldner contends, and correctlv, t ha t sociologi.sts are affected by these same processes and we must study their effect on sociologists and sociological theories. RecognLzLng this, Gouldner is calling for two thf.ngs which he lumps together under the rubric of "reflexive sociologv." On the one hand, he wants more studies, like his own, whf ch seek to exn LaLn the theories of sociologists by the md Lfeu in whLch they find t hemse Lves , Second Lv , he is calling for a heightened self-awareness on the part of sociologists of the effect of the social order on their work. One couLd hardLv Quarrel '-lith either of these points.
In add f.t Lon to the social se t t tng , t he theories developed bv soc LoLogLst s are affected by the "domain assumptions" of the author. He contends that all of us start with~ertain~ssumptions about, for example, man and society which determine the theories we will write or find to our likin~. So, in order to understand any s oc LoLogLca L t heorv we must analyze the social setting in whf.ch it is produced as well as the domain assumptions of its author. l~hile the settin~may be ascertained obj ectively, t he domain assumptions must be inferred from the theorv itself.
The major asset of this book lies in its effort to ascertain the effect of the social setting and do~ain assumptions on the theories of Talcott Parsons. It is when Gouldner turns from being an analyst to a critic that he finds himself in trouble. As an analyst Gouldner examines (but too brieflv) Parsons' upner middle class background, the Harvard setting in whi.ch he worked , and the prosperous situation in the country (and the world) when he was developing as a sociolo~ist. He finds, not surnrisinglv, t hat all of these factors heLp to explain tIle essential conservatism of Parsonsian theory. Gouldner sees Parsons as an apologist for the status~uo. If this is true, then he should find~arsons' theory undergoinR change as the nature of t he social system is exper Lenc Lng chanze . In fact, thi.s is exactlv what Gouldner does find. In the Depression vears of the 1930's Parsons emphasi.ze d the idea of "vo Lun t ar Lsm" in hf.s t heor'v . In effect, Parsons "{vas telling his audience that their actions did make a difference (although often not t he difference they intended) and therefore t hey should keep trying even though the system around them seemed bo be breoking down. Parsons believed in the system and felt that the Dcp r es s f.on was a t empora rv aherration. If evervone could be kept busy and involved (but not hop Lng for too much) t hf.nzs wou Ld shortlv change for the better. However, with the end of~vorld l,Jar II the American system had become prosperous and was moving in the direction of the welfare state. Hence he no longer had to worrv about keeping individuals involved in the syste~. What he did have to worrv about, though, was providing a rationale for the increasing intervention in societv of the welfare state. Parsons shifts and turns inc r eas LngLv to t he power of t he social system and its coercive effect on individual behavior. Even t hough Parsons shifted his focus to the system level, his theory never fit well with the interventionist policies of the welfare state. For one thing, much of wha t wen t on Ln Parsons f social svs tern l·7as spontaneous. For another, he sawall factors as interdependent and was unwilling to give one factor (such as the polity) preeminence. In fact, the difference between Parsonsian theory and the welfare state is one of the reasons that Gouldner offers for the current decline of Parsonsian t heory .
Before turning to Parsons' domain assumptions, it is important to note that there is another factor determining Parsonsian theorv. That is, hiR ongoind ebate with some of his theoretical predecessors. of nrinary importance is his disagreement~\1ith~f.arxian theory. So where~tarx is seen as giving nr tmarv emphasisto the economic subsystem, Parsons develops a model of the social svs t em in whd ch all subsvstemR are interdependent and none is of focal importance. Hhile Parsons likes the anti~farxism of theorists such as Weber and Sombart, he i~troubled by their determinism, pessimism and anti-capitalism. Thus he focuses on tIle idea of voluntarism which enables him to be anti-deterministic since men's actions do make a difference. Further, he can be optimistic because men's actions do make a difference and capitalism will survive. Th Ls , of" course, leads us to some of Parsons' dona In a ssumo t tons whi ch also serve to shape h Ls t heo rv . Perhaps the bes t wav to appr-oach this is to juxtapos e the domain assumptions Gou Ldrier infers from Parsons' rheorv "{V'ith~ouldner' s own domain assumptions.
(\Vhich, by the way, are not labelled by Gouldner as his domain assumptions. This is a major failing in the book, since Gouldner takes reat pains to show the importance of domain assumptions in sociological theorv. Apparently, reflexive sociologv is to anplv to all sociologists, except Gouldner.) In do doing, we can make the transi.tion to the second part of Gouldner's work, Ills cr Lt Lque of Parsons. I s ha Ll, not try to be exhaustive here, but s imnLv try to outline some of the najor domain assumptions of Par80ns and Gouldner.
Parsons -----1) "F'rom Parsons' standpoint emphasis is placed on the mechanisms that protect the interdependence and equilibrium of the svs t em as a lvhole.
f;ouldner _._-----"Fr-om our standpoint, errhasis would also be placed on the identification and analysis of the mechanisms that protect the functional autonomv of the
2) Emphasis on the importance of the society's moral code in maintaining order.
3) Emphasis~n the socialization process in molding man. arsons' domain assum~tions are the unitv of society, interdependence, e~uilibrium morality, socialization and order. These assumptions about man and societv have clearly p l aved a maj or role in shap Lng Parsons' theory.
4) Emphasis on order
When we turn from Parsons' domain assumptions to Gouldner's, we begin to see the Lnher errt weaknesses in h Ls critique of Parsons. Gouldner sees domain assumptions as metaphysical and concludes about Parsons: t'In a serious Rense, then, Parsons is not so much a Rubstantive social theorist ,as a~rand rnetaphvsician of contemporary sociology. If I object to Parsons' metaphysics, however, it is not because I object to metaphysics in general, but only those that are befuddled." (207) If Gouldner had been conten t to s top there, f ew wouLd argue , But, ever ambitious, Gouldner seeks to substitute his own rnetaphvsicR (dorn~in assumptions) for Parsons'. l-lell Gouldner doesn't li.ke Parsons' rnet aphvs Lcs , but I'm sure that Parsons would respond that he is not cnnmored of Gouldner'R metanhysics. So what: Is this where~ve are in sociology? Can we do no more than criticize someone else's assumptions and substitute our own? Personally, I like Gou1dner's assumptions more than those of Parsons, but that doesn't matter either. If the best we can do is bare our assumptions and call it theorv, then sociological theory is dead.
As Gouldner sees it, lIParsons persistently sees the partlv filled~lass of water as half-.~ull rather than hnlf-emp~y.II (290) On the other hand , Gouldner alwavs sees the glass as half-emntv. I frankly care about as much for how they see che world as how they see t he glass. In any case, Gouldner concludes that Parsonsian theory, as we know it, is entering a crisis stage. Among the reasons offered are the inherent contradictions in the theory, the growing demand for applied sociology which Parsonsian theory cannot sunply, and decline in the distinctiveness of functionalism as a sociological ,theory, the dissaffection of younger sociologists, and the growth of new theories such as those of Goffman, Garfinkel and Romans. lIe predicts that functionalism will survive, but in~changed form. More importantly he predicts that there will be a growth of radical sociological theory. It is on this growth that Gouldner is p f nnfng hf,s hopes for he sees hi.s reflexive aoc Lo.Logv as part of t ht s movement: "Reflexi.ve sociologv is and would need to be a radical s oc LoLogv , ff (489) I think Bennett Berger in a recent review of Gouldner's book is right when he says: '". . . regi.ments of radical young s oc LoLogLs t s in search of a guru [will] begin to beat a path to his door. 17 1 (280) A cynic mf.ght even say that it is~~lith this goal in mind that Gouldner wrote the book. Throughout the book Gouldner seems to be playing to just that audience. Two excerpts serve to illustrate this point; TIle self n • mus t at some point fight t he system of whf.ch it is part and those la7110 wisl1 to subject it to that system. Since I have been critical of functionalism as a methodology for sociology and anthropology, I have been enough interested in its history to do some elementary research on those ancestral figures, Bronislaw Malinowski (1884 Malinowski ( -1942 and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881 -1955 . I was alerted to something peculiar in Alvin Gouldner's treatment of these men by the summaries in the (laudatory) reviews by Bennett Berger, and so I purchased the book and read the sections in question. What I read, I found appalling, for instead of careful analysis I found innuendo and smear. Gouldner's discussions are so inadequate that it is hard to take them seriously. His cry for what he calls a "re f.Lexfve sociology" can scarcely be achieved if we are to begin that enterprise by a series of distortions of the work of those who helped to found the discipline. Let me illustrate with crucial examples.
I
While some Functional Anthropologists conceive4 it as their societal task to educate colonial administrators, none thought it their duty to tutor native revolutionaries (Gouldner 132) .
From 1924 onward, Malinowski held an appointment at the London School of Economics, an institution founded by the efforts of those Fabian socialists (and pioneer British sociologists), Sydney and Beatrice Webb. Both in terms of its original endowment and the desires of the Webbs, the London School was designed to teach how to reform society. This is not the place to assess the achievement of the School, but we should note that 'among the participants in Malinowski's seminars during the 1930's was Jomo Kenyatta, and Malinowski wrote the "Introduction" to the latter's book, Facing Mount Kenya (first published 1938). Clearly, Malinowski· did thereby assist and "tutor" at least one native revolutionary.
II
Functionalism • • • arose following World War I, which is to say, against the backdrop of a violent challenge to English dominion and Empire; it arose when English precedence was no longer taken for granted, when the English could no longer feel confident • • • • Etc. In this setting the prospect was not the inevitable uplifting of backward colonies in their common evolution toward the future; the task was now to hold on to the colonies and to keep them under control. The sanguine expectation of progress gave way to the grim problem of order (Gouldner 127 ).
Radcliffe-Brown gained a scholarship to Trinity Coll~ge, Cambridge in 1901 where he studied what was then called moral and political science. While there, he fell under the influence of the Russian anarchist exile, Prince Peter Kropotkin, whose book on Mutual Aid was just being published (1902) . Kropotkin had conducted naturalistic investigations in Siberia and thereby come to the conclusion that Darwinistic theories about the struggle for survival were a misinterpretation of the cooperative relationship among the members of a species. He extended these notions to the human world, and evidently he stimulated the young Brown to take up the study of comparative sociology. "Kropotkin pointed out to the young reformer (Brown) that it was necessary to study and understand society before trying to change it and that in order to understand such a complex society as Victorian England one should begin by making a systematic study of a faraway primitive community" (Srinivas 1958 : xviii-xix).
Accordingly, in 1906 "Anarchy" Brown went to the Andaman Islands and there conducted his first and most famous field researches. He returned to England in 1908, and his fellowship thesis was the first draft of what later was issued as The Andaman Islanders (while the book was not published until after the war, its rewriting from thesis to book was completed in 1914).
In the case of 'Malinowski, the field researches on the Trobriand Islands were conducted during the period 1915-18, while hLs firs t maj or publication bas ed on these researches, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, was in 1922. Given these historical facts, it is hard to find merit in Gouldner's attempt to portray functionalist anthropology as a phenomenon of declining colonialism, emerging after the first World War.
III
In approaching English anthropology, it is vital to understand the gentlemanly self-image of its practitioners and of its audience of administrators (Gouldner 132 ).
More than any other scientists, Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski --especially the latter --were responsible for the introduction into social anthropology of intensive personal field research. Prior to their work and their teachings, even the most eminent of anthropological scholars worked with data gathered by other men, for natives were regarded as if they were zoological specimens to be held at armts length. In sharp contrast, the students of Malinowski and RadcliffeBrown were sent to live for many months in intimate contact with native peoples. Such conduct on the part of educated Europeans must have been profoundly shocking to the administrators, merchants, plantation operators, and missionaries of the colonial regions. Living with native peoples in a situation of social parity was an act that broke the color bar which kept natives and Europeans in social isolation from each other. These experiences of intimate living led social anthropologists to perceive' native peoples as the cultural and intellectual equals of the Europeans, and this attitude is strongly stated even in the earliest works of Malinowski. Over and over again Malinowski contended that the native was equally human with the European, and that, if the native was to be classified as a "savage" why then so too were the colonial administrators and the anthropologist himself.
It is too easy today to forget that functionalist anthropology represented a critical attack on Social Darwinist theories that placed the non-European (native) peoples at the base of a ladder of evolutionary ascent. Today, profiting by the intellectual liberation achieved by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown,men like Gouldner may derogate their work. He does so at his Own peril, for it is precisely the labors of Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and their students, which undermined the moral and intellectual pretensions of colonial policies. We should be grateful to these pioneer functionalists for their courage and their honesty.
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